Content material warning: Due to the character of among the actions we found, this collection of articles comprises content material that some readers could discover upsetting. This contains profanity and references to medication, drug habit, playing, pornography, violence, arson, and intercourse work. These references are textual solely and don’t embody photographs or movies.
Having explored the ‘reputable’ and not-so-legitimate enterprise pursuits that menace actors are discussing on felony boards, we’ve arrived on the concluding chapter of our collection. Right here, we’ll talk about the implications and alternatives that these actions current.
As we’ve famous all through this collection, menace actors diversifying into different industries and felony actions can have troubling penalties. It could make disrupting these menace actors tougher, notably with regards to seizing belongings, and might make investigations – ‘following the cash’ – extra complicated. Furthermore, it might probably enhance menace actors’ wealth, energy, and affect, which once more can complicate investigations. And it implies that their crimes can have an effect on extra victims, straight or not directly.
Within the cybersecurity business, we typically deal with cybercrime as being in a silo – to think about it a definite, specialist, and remoted exercise, restricted to the digital world of networks and hosts. Not unreasonably, our efforts are typically centered on the ‘cyber kill chain’; standard menace intelligence; and bolstering protections, safety consciousness, and different preventative measures. And within the wake of assaults, our consideration often goes to the victims – whether or not these are organizations coping with incidents, or people who’ve been scammed.
In the meantime, the perpetrators slip again into the shadows, and we don’t sometimes take into consideration what they do as soon as an assault is over, or the place the cash goes. This query has not traditionally been prioritized by safety researchers.
However maybe we should always spend extra time trying into how cybercriminals are utilizing and investing their income. Doing so can result in further investigative and intelligence alternatives round attribution, motivation, connections, and extra.
Furthermore, among the actions we’ve uncovered on this collection strongly recommend that we should always not put menace actors on any sort of pedestal. They aren’t simply cybercriminals – they’re criminals, full cease. They shouldn’t be glorified, or celebrated, or portrayed as something besides what they’re: individuals who earn a living on the expense of victims. Our investigation means that a minimum of some menace actors are engaged in exploitative, dangerous, and unlawful actions, each on-line and in the true world, from which they’re actively profiting.
Proactive intelligence-gathering and investigation on the boundaries of reputable and illegitimate earnings, and of cybercrime and real-world crime/enterprise, may assist hit menace actors the place it actually hurts – their cash. Whereas we don’t declare that this may be straightforward to perform, the knowledge we’ve shared on this collection may very well be a useful first step in laying the foundations for future efforts and analysis on this vein.
Attribution and investigative avenues
As proven in our earlier articles, the schemes and techniques which menace actors define intimately on felony boards – typically accompanied by screenshots, images, and particular biographical info – can present investigative and attribution alternatives which have beforehand been underexplored. These may be notably helpful on felony boards, the place contributors are sometimes nameless.
For example, throughout the course of our investigation, we famous menace actors revealing the next info of their discussions of ‘authorized enterprise’:
- References to the areas (international locations/areas/cities) in they reside and/or function
- Different biographical info, together with age, marital standing, and whether or not they had kids
- Unredacted or partially redacted screenshots revealing profile footage, names, addresses, and reference numbers
- Pictures of areas, which may doubtlessly be recognized via open-source investigation
- References to particular quantities of cash and purchases, typically accompanied by dates and occasions
- References to earlier convictions, which may very well be used for attainable identification
- Detailed discussions of authorized or unlawful schemes and actions
- Particulars of recommendation obtained from attorneys, accountants, and associates.
Understanding thine enemy
Our investigation additionally demonstrates the breadth and depth of information that menace actors possess about varied industries, loopholes, rules, investigative methods, and laws in varied territories and international locations – in addition to what they find out about cash laundering and legitimizing methods. All of this will present investigators with helpful details about what menace actors know and what they don’t, which may help to tell future operations. It additionally offers a broader view of the menace panorama, and the way the cyber model of that panorama interacts and overlaps with menace landscapes in different felony domains – leading to a richer strategic intelligence image.
Alternatives for collaboration
We hope that our analysis could encourage higher collaboration between the cybersecurity business, regulation enforcement, and regulators, as a result of it might probably assist hyperlink the incidents we cope with and reply to day by day, to the real-world offenses, belongings, and companies which regulation enforcement and regulators have the power, and mandate, to analyze. Once more, we don’t declare that our analysis will clear up this downside, however we expect it could present some helpful frequent floor to encourage collaboration and information-sharing.
The proof we uncovered – of hyperlinks between carders and drug sellers; menace actors and varied industries and sectors; and menace actors and real-world felony exercise – signifies that we may doubtlessly hyperlink some cybercriminals to the move of the ensuing funds into wider economies, whether or not felony or reputable. Whereas this may require openness, willingness, and cautious administration, we propose that extra may and ought to be finished to analyze, monitor, and disrupt menace actors utilizing the type of info we’ve mentioned.
Some preliminary sensible solutions:
- Researchers may flag discussions about new strategies of cash laundering, authorized and unlawful investments, insights about menace actor teams (areas, motivations, capabilities, connections, and many others.), and monetary identifiers to factors of contact in regulation enforcement and monetary regulatory our bodies
- Legislation enforcement officers and monetary investigators may share identifiers and indicators from their very own investigations with researchers, to find out if there are hyperlinks to campaigns or particular teams
- Each events could profit from embedding packages specializing in these areas of crossover.
Including to the kill chain?
Whereas that is extra of a theoretical suggestion, it is likely to be value contemplating including two steps to the tip of the kill chain when coping with financially motivated menace actors:
- Cashing out and cash laundering. Financially motivated menace actors need to notice a revenue and disguise the origin of their funds
- Spending and funding. This step could overlap with the earlier one to some extent, however right here, menace actors are in search of to spend/make investments their illicit positive aspects, and use them to generate additional revenue, moderately than merely disguising the supply(s)
Each steps could also be helpful additions to the kill chain for 4 causes:
- They’re areas by which some menace actors is likely to be much less acquainted/succesful, so they might make errors or let slip revealing info, resulting in alternatives for attribution and additional investigation
- They might contain interplay with monetary authorities, a wider monetary ecosystem, and/or regulatory companies, growing alternatives for monitoring and ‘pink flags’
- These are the factors at which we are able to harm financially motivated menace actors essentially the most – within the pocket – so it is sensible to dedicate a minimum of some consideration to them
- As mentioned beforehand, these steps provide potential for collaboration, information-sharing, and cooperation with monetary and regulation enforcement authorities.
Caveats and future analysis
Our work on this collection centered on a choice of felony boards, however boards don’t inform us the whole lot there’s to know in regards to the felony ecosystem. Nevertheless, we did select a number of outstanding boards identified to be frequented by prolific menace actors (together with ransomware associates, preliminary entry brokers, and malware builders), and boards can present a useful glimpse into an underexplored space.
Finally, although, we solely checked out 5 boards, so our work ought to be thought-about extra of an preliminary exploration than an exhaustive survey.
Linking the crimes and enterprise practices mentioned on this discuss to particular incidents, campaigns, and menace actors represents a problem, one past the scope of this work. Nevertheless, we famous that in a number of circumstances, menace actors didn’t merely hypothesize or present common particulars, however admitted to particular exercise, typically together with images, areas, and biographical info (though we also needs to level out that some menace actors may very well be mendacity or embellishing their claims).
Future analysis on this subject may embody:
- Extra detailed investigations, together with analysis into different boards, marketplaces, Telegram channels, and many others., evaluating the outcomes to ours, and figuring out additional alternatives for attribution, investigation, monitoring, and collaboration
- Exploration of the feasibility of linking particular assaults and campaigns to particular investments and enterprise practices – which can contain collaboration, information-sharing, monetary evaluation, and/or tracing cryptocurrency
- Statistical analysis into the prevalence of varied crimes/enterprise pursuits, to realize an understanding of that are commonest amongst financially motivated menace actors, and whether or not they differ in accordance with geography and sort of menace actor (infostealer campaigns versus ransomware, for instance).
Wrapping up
Whereas there has beforehand been analysis into particular strategies of cryptocurrency laundering utilized by cybercriminals (notably ransomware actors), that is, to our data, the primary exploration of so-called ‘authorized enterprise’ discussions on felony boards, which have been round for nearly twenty years on two very outstanding, well-established Russian-language boards, and for a shorter time on others.
These sections have traditionally been neglected by researchers, presumably as a result of they don’t seem to comprise a lot of relevance to cybersecurity. We imagine that is an oversight, which our work seeks to deal with by highlighting each the strategic and tactical intelligence advantages that exploring and monitoring these sections can convey.
There’s an in depth range and plurality of investments, schemes, and enterprise pursuits – each authorized and unlawful – that financially motivated menace actors talk about and turn out to be concerned in after taking advantage of assaults. We encourage our colleagues within the cybersecurity neighborhood to think about financially motivated cybercrime as an integral a part of a wider financial system, moderately than a siloed and remoted exercise.
Particularly, we invite colleagues to:
- Take into account the place menace actors are investing and spending their cash after assaults – and whether or not this might present further context and worth
- Share info with friends, regulation enforcement, and different related companies, akin to monetary regulators; requesting info in return
- The place applicable, consider cybercrime not as an remoted exercise in and of itself, however as a part of a a lot wider and extra complicated ecosystem linked to different felony networks
- Mirror on, and contribute to, our suggestion of together with further steps on the cyber kill chain
As we famous earlier, we take into account this analysis to be a place to begin. We’re persevering with to look into this subject, and we sit up for sharing further findings sooner or later.
Content material warning: Due to the character of among the actions we found, this collection of articles comprises content material that some readers could discover upsetting. This contains profanity and references to medication, drug habit, playing, pornography, violence, arson, and intercourse work. These references are textual solely and don’t embody photographs or movies.
Having explored the ‘reputable’ and not-so-legitimate enterprise pursuits that menace actors are discussing on felony boards, we’ve arrived on the concluding chapter of our collection. Right here, we’ll talk about the implications and alternatives that these actions current.
As we’ve famous all through this collection, menace actors diversifying into different industries and felony actions can have troubling penalties. It could make disrupting these menace actors tougher, notably with regards to seizing belongings, and might make investigations – ‘following the cash’ – extra complicated. Furthermore, it might probably enhance menace actors’ wealth, energy, and affect, which once more can complicate investigations. And it implies that their crimes can have an effect on extra victims, straight or not directly.
Within the cybersecurity business, we typically deal with cybercrime as being in a silo – to think about it a definite, specialist, and remoted exercise, restricted to the digital world of networks and hosts. Not unreasonably, our efforts are typically centered on the ‘cyber kill chain’; standard menace intelligence; and bolstering protections, safety consciousness, and different preventative measures. And within the wake of assaults, our consideration often goes to the victims – whether or not these are organizations coping with incidents, or people who’ve been scammed.
In the meantime, the perpetrators slip again into the shadows, and we don’t sometimes take into consideration what they do as soon as an assault is over, or the place the cash goes. This query has not traditionally been prioritized by safety researchers.
However maybe we should always spend extra time trying into how cybercriminals are utilizing and investing their income. Doing so can result in further investigative and intelligence alternatives round attribution, motivation, connections, and extra.
Furthermore, among the actions we’ve uncovered on this collection strongly recommend that we should always not put menace actors on any sort of pedestal. They aren’t simply cybercriminals – they’re criminals, full cease. They shouldn’t be glorified, or celebrated, or portrayed as something besides what they’re: individuals who earn a living on the expense of victims. Our investigation means that a minimum of some menace actors are engaged in exploitative, dangerous, and unlawful actions, each on-line and in the true world, from which they’re actively profiting.
Proactive intelligence-gathering and investigation on the boundaries of reputable and illegitimate earnings, and of cybercrime and real-world crime/enterprise, may assist hit menace actors the place it actually hurts – their cash. Whereas we don’t declare that this may be straightforward to perform, the knowledge we’ve shared on this collection may very well be a useful first step in laying the foundations for future efforts and analysis on this vein.
Attribution and investigative avenues
As proven in our earlier articles, the schemes and techniques which menace actors define intimately on felony boards – typically accompanied by screenshots, images, and particular biographical info – can present investigative and attribution alternatives which have beforehand been underexplored. These may be notably helpful on felony boards, the place contributors are sometimes nameless.
For example, throughout the course of our investigation, we famous menace actors revealing the next info of their discussions of ‘authorized enterprise’:
- References to the areas (international locations/areas/cities) in they reside and/or function
- Different biographical info, together with age, marital standing, and whether or not they had kids
- Unredacted or partially redacted screenshots revealing profile footage, names, addresses, and reference numbers
- Pictures of areas, which may doubtlessly be recognized via open-source investigation
- References to particular quantities of cash and purchases, typically accompanied by dates and occasions
- References to earlier convictions, which may very well be used for attainable identification
- Detailed discussions of authorized or unlawful schemes and actions
- Particulars of recommendation obtained from attorneys, accountants, and associates.
Understanding thine enemy
Our investigation additionally demonstrates the breadth and depth of information that menace actors possess about varied industries, loopholes, rules, investigative methods, and laws in varied territories and international locations – in addition to what they find out about cash laundering and legitimizing methods. All of this will present investigators with helpful details about what menace actors know and what they don’t, which may help to tell future operations. It additionally offers a broader view of the menace panorama, and the way the cyber model of that panorama interacts and overlaps with menace landscapes in different felony domains – leading to a richer strategic intelligence image.
Alternatives for collaboration
We hope that our analysis could encourage higher collaboration between the cybersecurity business, regulation enforcement, and regulators, as a result of it might probably assist hyperlink the incidents we cope with and reply to day by day, to the real-world offenses, belongings, and companies which regulation enforcement and regulators have the power, and mandate, to analyze. Once more, we don’t declare that our analysis will clear up this downside, however we expect it could present some helpful frequent floor to encourage collaboration and information-sharing.
The proof we uncovered – of hyperlinks between carders and drug sellers; menace actors and varied industries and sectors; and menace actors and real-world felony exercise – signifies that we may doubtlessly hyperlink some cybercriminals to the move of the ensuing funds into wider economies, whether or not felony or reputable. Whereas this may require openness, willingness, and cautious administration, we propose that extra may and ought to be finished to analyze, monitor, and disrupt menace actors utilizing the type of info we’ve mentioned.
Some preliminary sensible solutions:
- Researchers may flag discussions about new strategies of cash laundering, authorized and unlawful investments, insights about menace actor teams (areas, motivations, capabilities, connections, and many others.), and monetary identifiers to factors of contact in regulation enforcement and monetary regulatory our bodies
- Legislation enforcement officers and monetary investigators may share identifiers and indicators from their very own investigations with researchers, to find out if there are hyperlinks to campaigns or particular teams
- Each events could profit from embedding packages specializing in these areas of crossover.
Including to the kill chain?
Whereas that is extra of a theoretical suggestion, it is likely to be value contemplating including two steps to the tip of the kill chain when coping with financially motivated menace actors:
- Cashing out and cash laundering. Financially motivated menace actors need to notice a revenue and disguise the origin of their funds
- Spending and funding. This step could overlap with the earlier one to some extent, however right here, menace actors are in search of to spend/make investments their illicit positive aspects, and use them to generate additional revenue, moderately than merely disguising the supply(s)
Each steps could also be helpful additions to the kill chain for 4 causes:
- They’re areas by which some menace actors is likely to be much less acquainted/succesful, so they might make errors or let slip revealing info, resulting in alternatives for attribution and additional investigation
- They might contain interplay with monetary authorities, a wider monetary ecosystem, and/or regulatory companies, growing alternatives for monitoring and ‘pink flags’
- These are the factors at which we are able to harm financially motivated menace actors essentially the most – within the pocket – so it is sensible to dedicate a minimum of some consideration to them
- As mentioned beforehand, these steps provide potential for collaboration, information-sharing, and cooperation with monetary and regulation enforcement authorities.
Caveats and future analysis
Our work on this collection centered on a choice of felony boards, however boards don’t inform us the whole lot there’s to know in regards to the felony ecosystem. Nevertheless, we did select a number of outstanding boards identified to be frequented by prolific menace actors (together with ransomware associates, preliminary entry brokers, and malware builders), and boards can present a useful glimpse into an underexplored space.
Finally, although, we solely checked out 5 boards, so our work ought to be thought-about extra of an preliminary exploration than an exhaustive survey.
Linking the crimes and enterprise practices mentioned on this discuss to particular incidents, campaigns, and menace actors represents a problem, one past the scope of this work. Nevertheless, we famous that in a number of circumstances, menace actors didn’t merely hypothesize or present common particulars, however admitted to particular exercise, typically together with images, areas, and biographical info (though we also needs to level out that some menace actors may very well be mendacity or embellishing their claims).
Future analysis on this subject may embody:
- Extra detailed investigations, together with analysis into different boards, marketplaces, Telegram channels, and many others., evaluating the outcomes to ours, and figuring out additional alternatives for attribution, investigation, monitoring, and collaboration
- Exploration of the feasibility of linking particular assaults and campaigns to particular investments and enterprise practices – which can contain collaboration, information-sharing, monetary evaluation, and/or tracing cryptocurrency
- Statistical analysis into the prevalence of varied crimes/enterprise pursuits, to realize an understanding of that are commonest amongst financially motivated menace actors, and whether or not they differ in accordance with geography and sort of menace actor (infostealer campaigns versus ransomware, for instance).
Wrapping up
Whereas there has beforehand been analysis into particular strategies of cryptocurrency laundering utilized by cybercriminals (notably ransomware actors), that is, to our data, the primary exploration of so-called ‘authorized enterprise’ discussions on felony boards, which have been round for nearly twenty years on two very outstanding, well-established Russian-language boards, and for a shorter time on others.
These sections have traditionally been neglected by researchers, presumably as a result of they don’t seem to comprise a lot of relevance to cybersecurity. We imagine that is an oversight, which our work seeks to deal with by highlighting each the strategic and tactical intelligence advantages that exploring and monitoring these sections can convey.
There’s an in depth range and plurality of investments, schemes, and enterprise pursuits – each authorized and unlawful – that financially motivated menace actors talk about and turn out to be concerned in after taking advantage of assaults. We encourage our colleagues within the cybersecurity neighborhood to think about financially motivated cybercrime as an integral a part of a wider financial system, moderately than a siloed and remoted exercise.
Particularly, we invite colleagues to:
- Take into account the place menace actors are investing and spending their cash after assaults – and whether or not this might present further context and worth
- Share info with friends, regulation enforcement, and different related companies, akin to monetary regulators; requesting info in return
- The place applicable, consider cybercrime not as an remoted exercise in and of itself, however as a part of a a lot wider and extra complicated ecosystem linked to different felony networks
- Mirror on, and contribute to, our suggestion of together with further steps on the cyber kill chain
As we famous earlier, we take into account this analysis to be a place to begin. We’re persevering with to look into this subject, and we sit up for sharing further findings sooner or later.
